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ARTICLES
(NON)OBVIOUSNESS OF CLAIMS TO GENETIC
SEQUENCES: FINDING THE MIDDLE GROUND
Mark Polyakovt & Eugene Goryunovtt
Abstract
In KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court restored the
"expansive and flexible approach" to the obviousness inquiry
required under Title 35 of the United States Code. This article
concludes that the KSR decision should prompt changes in the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's (CAFC) jurisprudence on the
obviousness standard. The article reviews the many CAFC rulings on
this standard, from In re O'Farrell through In re Deuel, showing how
the CAFC departed from the standard obviousness inquiry. The focus
then turns to the KSR decision and shows that the analysis of the
CAFC did not follow a proper analysis, even where the results would
have remained unchanged. Finally, this article propose an expansive
yet flexible test for evaluating obviousness of claims to genetic
sequences to aid the CAFC in its obviousness analysis.
This article examines the impact of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.' regarding the
nonobviousness standard for the patentability of genetic sequences. In
KSR, the Supreme Court restored the "expansive and flexible
approach" to the obviousness inquiry.2 Our analysis concludes that
KSR should lead to the long-overdue overhaul of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's (CAFC) jurisprudence in this area and
proposes a new test to determine whether claims to genetic sequences
are obvious.
We begin our discussion with a brief review of the
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1. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
2. Id. at 415.
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nonobviousness requirement of the Patent Statute and the CAFC's
pre-KSR nonobviousness jurisprudence regarding genetic sequences,
including the progression from In re O'Farrell3 through In re Deuel.4
We will demonstrate that the CAFC departed from the proper
obviousness inquiry, which asks whether a person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA) would have found it obvious to arrive at
the claimed invention, and took an overly rigid approach to the
obviousness analysis of genetic sequences. As a result, according to
the CAFC's framework developed in In re Bell5 and Deuel, genetic
sequences are almost always non-obvious, unless they are structurally
similar to the prior art. This is an improper conclusion.
We then review in some detail a general nonobviousness
analysis and the Supreme Court's KSR decision. While the facts in
KSR did not relate to genetic sequences, we assert that the principles
enunciated by the Court have broad implications extending to all
areas of obviousness, including claims to genetic sequences. We
continue by analyzing the decision of United States Patent &
Trademark Office ("USPTO") Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("the Board") decision in Ex Parte Kubin6 and its
attempt to distinguish the fact pattern in that case from those of Bell
and Deuel. In Kubin, decided after KSR, the Board revisited the
obviousness analysis of genetic sequences and essentially discarded
the Bell/Deuel approach. We conclude that while the Board ultimately
arrived at the correct result, that result is inconsistent with a faithful
application of the Bell/Deuel framework. We also conclude that the
CAFC's pre-KSR obviousness jurisprudence regarding claims to
genetic sequences is unnecessarily rigid and loses sight of the proper
obviousness inquiry mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 103 and Supreme Court
precedent. Thus, we urge the CAFC to affirm the Kubin Board's
decision as it relates to obviousness and clarify the obviousness
standard for claims to generic sequences by overruling Bell and Deuel
to the extent that each requires knowledge in the art of structurally
similar genetic sequences to support a finding of obviousness. To aid
the CAFC, we propose an expansive yet flexible test for evaluating
obviousness of claims to genetic sequences.
Under our test, one needs to first establish a prima facie case of
3. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 902-904 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557-1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
5. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783-785 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
6. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410 (B.P.A.I. 2007), aff'd, 561 F.3d 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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obviousness by demonstrating that both (1) the protein encoded by the
claimed sequence(s) is known in the art, and (2) its amino acid
sequence is known or can be readily determined by conventional
methods in order to render claims to genetic sequences obvious. If the
prima facie case is established, the claims at issue are obvious as a
matter of law unless the applicant rebuts the prima facie case by, for
example, relying on so-called "secondary considerations,"'
unexpected results, and/or surprising or unexpected properties of the
sequences to establish its nonobviousness.
We argue that our proposed approach strikes a sensible middle
ground between two extremes: holding all claims to genetic
sequences nonobvious unless a structurally similar molecule is known
in prior art (e.g., Deuel) and holding all claims to genetic sequences
of a protein obvious if the protein is known in the art. Our test would
also achieve a proper balance between encouraging scientific
development by granting patents on true innovations and protecting
the public from patents that should never be granted.
I. NONOBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS IN GENERAL AND AS APPLIED TO
GENETIC SEQUENCES
A. General 35 U.S.C. § 103 Nonobviousness Analysis
An invention has to be nonobvious over the prior art. As 35
U.S.C. § 103 states in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.8
The inquiry for nonobviousness may consider the combination of
several prior art references in the same field of art.9 The Supreme
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City explained that a
finding of obviousness depends on the (1) scope and content of the
prior art, (2) differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,
(3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) secondary considerations of an
7. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2008).
9. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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indicia of nonobviousness. 10 It is accepted that "virtually all
inventions are combinations of old elements" 11 and that a person
having ordinary skill in the art "may often find every element of a
claimed invention in the prior art." 12 If the identification of elements
of the invention in the prior art was sufficient to negate patentability,
very few patents would ever issue. 13
B. CAFC's pre-KSR Obviousness Analysis of Claims to Genetic
Sequences
Throughout the years, the CAFC has developed a special
obviousness analysis of the claims to genetic sequences. However,
prior to discussing specific cases, we provide a brief scientific
background which is necessary for an understanding of the issues
involved.
1.Overview of DNA, Genes, and Proteins
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a nucleic acid located on
chromosomes in the nucleus of a cell, functions as a blueprint of an
organism's genetic information.14 In nature, DNA exists as a double
strand of two long chains of nucleotides.15 The nucleotides consist of
deoxyribose, phosphate, and one of four bases, adenine (A), guanine
(G), thymine (T), and Cytosine (C).' 6 The two chains are held
together by complementary base pairing, so that A always binds with
T, and G always binds with C.'"
Genes are segments of DNA that carry genetic information. To
greatly simplify, genes encode amino acids which make up proteins
that are an essential part of our organisms.18 A triplet of three
10. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. (explaining that the secondary considerations may
include commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.). The Court
noted that the four-factor approach should be applied on a "case-by-case" basis because there is
no hard-pressed rule as to what is or is not obvious without more context. Id.
11. Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
12. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
13. See Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(suggesting that similarities in the prior art should not be enough to negate patentability because
such approach would be "an illogical and inappropriate process.").
14. See generally W. ELLIOTT, et al., BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (1997)
(providing a more thorough discussion).
15. Id. at 242.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. BRUCE ALBERTS et al., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 104 (3 d ed. 1994).
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nucleotides, referred to as a "codon," encodes one amino acid.' 9
Accordingly, a gene can be thought of as a sequence of codons which
determines the sequence of amino acids comprising a particular
protein. As there are only twenty different amino acids but sixty-four
possible codons, the genetic code is naturally redundant: i.e., most
amino acids are specified by more than one codon. 20 Thus, scientists
refer to the genetic code as degenerate.2 1
Protein synthesis is the creation of proteins using DNA and
ribonucleic acid (RNA). It occurs in vivo through two stages:
transcription and translation. First, in transcription, the messenger
RNA molecule, or mRNA, is transcribed from DNA.22 Importantly,
there is no chemical conversion of a DNA molecule into an mRNA
molecule. Rather, the information encoded in the DNA molecule is
transferred to the mRNA molecule. The mRNA is complementary to
the transcribed DNA, that is, it matches the corresponding DNA.
Then, in translation, another part of a cell, called a "ribosome,"
translates the nucleotide sequence of the mRNA into the amino acid
23
sequence, thus making a protein. Therefore, the nucleotide sequence
of DNA determines the protein structure and function.
2. Recombinant DNA Technology
Recombinant DNA technology is used to produce human
24proteins in bacteria. In essence, a portion of human DNA coding for
a specific protein is inserted into a bacteria using, for example, a
bacterial plasmid vector.25 If successful, the bacteria will "express"
the desired protein, thus ensuring its continuous supply.26
Before a gene coding for a desired protein can be inserted into
bacteria, it must be isolated from other genes. 27 To isolate a gene,
scientists first construct complementary DNA ("cDNA") libraries.2 8 A
cDNA library contains a mixture of cDNA molecules synthesized
19. Id. at 106.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 105.
23. Id., at 107.
24. Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness And The
Balance Between Biotech Inventors And The Market, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 53, 59 (Winter
1996).
25. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A vector is a piece of DNA that
replicates itself when introduced into bacteria. Id.
26. Varma & Abraham, supra note 24, at 59.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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from all mRNA molecules with the help of an enzyme called reverse
transcriptase.29 In other words, cDNA molecules are "clones" of
mRNA. 30 These cDNA libraries are tissue-specific because proteins
are usually expressed in specific tissues. 31 The process of constructing
cDNA libraries was well known to skilled artisans by as early as
1980.32
The next step in the process involves the design of a gene probe
to screen the cDNA libraries. A gene probe is a synthetic radio-
labeled nucleic acid sequence which is designed to bond or
"hybridize" to a target cDNA sequence in the cDNA libraries.33 A
PHOSITA, knowing the amino acid sequence of a protein, can design
the probe that has a higher probability of success to hybridize to the
desired clone. Due to the redundancy of the genetic code, a PHOSITA
does not immediately know which specific nucleic acid sequence
code is associated with the desired protein.34 However, one can
increase the probability of selecting the appropriate probe by using
well-known principles. One technique, for example, involves
avoiding regions which are rich in amino acids coded by five to six
codons, and instead selecting regions which are rich in amino acids
coded by one or two codons.3 5 Moreover, the problem of redundancy
is mitigated by the fact that any sequence of sixteen or more
36nucleotides is likely to be unique in the human genome. Further,
there are special "codon catalogs" which list the preferences of
various species in codon selection. Thus, a PHOSITA can solve, or
at least mitigate, the problems caused by the redundancy of the
genetic code. If a portion of the cDNA sequence of the target protein
is known, then the probes can be longer in length and thus simplify
the cloning of the whole gene.38
Armed with this background, we now turn to discussion of the
three CAFC cases dealing specifically with genetic sequences.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
32. Varma & Abraham, supra note 24, at 61.
33. Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1555.
34. Each amino acid may be coded by more than one codon. See discussion supra PART
1.2.A-B.
35. Varma & Abraham, supra note 24, at 62.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 64.
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3. CAFC Develops a Special Obviousness Test for Claims
to Genetic Sequences
a. In re O'Farrell
O'Farrell appears to be the first case where the CAFC grappled
with obviousness of patents relating to gene sequences. The
applicants' claimed invention was directed toward a method for
producing a certain human protein in a species of bacteria using a
chimeric construct of heterologous human DNA fused to the
bacteria's regulatory sequence. 39 The prior art described the
successful insertion of a frog ribosomal RNA gene into E. coli to
achieve transcription of the frog gene inside the bacterium. 4 0 The
prior art also pointed out that if a heterologous gene were encoded for
a specific protein, one should expect to produce a "fused protein." 4 1
The main difference between the prior art and the claimed
invention was that the heterologous gene in the claimed invention was
for a predetermined protein, while it was for a ribosomal RNA in the
42prior art. On appeal, the applicants argued that the prior art did not
render the claimed invention obvious due to significant
unpredictability in the field of molecular biology.43 They asserted that
since it was not certain whether a heterologous protein could be
produced in bacteria, the prior art merely amounted to "invitations to
those skilled in the art to try to make the claimed invention" so that
the obviousness rejection was based on the improper "obvious to try"
standard.4
On review, the CAFC held the claimed method to be obvious. In
rejecting the applicants' nonobviousness arguments, the court
explained that any "obvious" invention would also have been, in a
sense, "obvious to try." 4 5 The proper question to resolve was "when
[would] an invention that was obvious to try nevertheless [remain]
nonobvious?" 4 6 In answering this question, the court explained that
the admonition not to rely on the "obvious to try" standard in
obviousness rejections was directed at two types of errors: (1) the
holding of an invention to be "obvious" to try when one would have
39. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
40. Id. at 900.
41. Id. at 901.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 902.
44. Id.
45. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
46. Id.
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to "vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until
one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave
either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction
as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful," 47 and
(2) when that which "was 'obvious to try' was to explore a new
technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of
experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to
the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it." 48
b. In re Bell
Four years after O'Farrell, the CAFC set out to clarify the
nonobviousness standard that it first annunciated in Bell. The claimed
invention in Bell was directed to a DNA sequence which coded
human insulin-like growth factors. The prior art disclosed the entire
amino acid sequences for the claimed growth factors and described a
general method for isolating a gene for which at least a short amino
acid sequence was already known.4 9 The Board affirmed the
examiner's obviousness rejection by stating that a protein and its
DNA are linked via the genetic code, and thus, one skilled in the art
of cloning who had the knowledge of the amino acid sequence of the
desired protein would be able to predictably clone the desired DNA
sequence without undue experimentation.o
On review, the CAFC reversed.51 The court expressly rejected
the examiner's and the Board's proposition that "the established
relationship in the genetic code between a nucleic acid and the protein
it encodes.. . makes a gene prima facie obvious over its
correspondent protein." 52 The court stated that because the prior art
suggested an infinite number of possible nucleotide sequences, "and
the failure of the cited prior art to suggest which of those possibilities
is the human sequence, the claimed sequences would not have been
obvious."53 The CAFC, however, allowed for the possibility that a
gene may be rendered obvious when the amino acid sequence of its
coded protein is known and where the "known amino acid sequence is
specified exclusively by unique codons."54
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 784.
53. Id.
54. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Varma & Abraham, supra
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This reasoning is not entirely convincing. Commentators have
pointed out that the state of the art at the time of the claimed invention
would have allowed for a relatively routine selection of the proper
oligonucleotide probe to determine the amino acid sequence of
interest despite the degeneracy of the genetic code." Thus, contrary to
the CAFC's position, a PHOSITA at the time of invention would have
had a reasonable expectation of success to arrive at the invention
claimed in Bell without undue experimentation.5
c. In re Deuel
Just three years later, the CAFC further refined its
nonobviousness test. The invention at issue was related to isolated
and purified DNA and cDNA molecules encoding heparin-binding
growth factors (HBGFs). 57 Deuel isolated and purified HBGF from
bovine uterine tissue and "determined the first 25 amino acids of the
protein's N-terminal sequence."5 He then isolated a cDNA molecule
encoding bovine uterine HBGF by screening a bovine uterine cDNA
library with an oligonucleotide probe, sequenced the cDNA molecule,
and predicted the complete amino acid sequence." The isolated
bovine uterine cDNA clone was then used as a probe to screen a
human placental cDNA library to isolate a cDNA molecule encoding
human placental HBGF and to sequence and predict the complete
amino acid sequence of the human placental HBGF.6 o
The four independent claims were as follows:
4. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence
encoding human heparin-binding growth factor of 168 amino acids
having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gin Ala ...
[remainder of 168 amino acid sequence].
5. The purified and isolated cDNA of human heparin-binding
growth factor having the following nucleotide sequence:
note 29, at 74 (noting that from a practical standpoint, it is rarely the case that a sufficient
number of amino acids are encoded exclusively by unique codons. Only two amino acids use
unique codons (methionine and tryptophan), and finding a contiguous sequence consisting of
solely these two amino acids is very unusual).
55. See Varma & Abraham, supra note 29, at 73 (pointing out that the "nearly infinite"
number of possible sequences cited by the Court is probably wrong since the prior art would
allow relatively routine handling of possible sequences, and that the USPTO never commented
on why the "I in 10"" argument was misleading).
56. See id.
57. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
58. Id. at 1555.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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GTCAAAGGCA ... [remainder of 961 nucleotide sequence].
6. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting of a sequence
encoding bovine heparin-binding growth factor of 168 amino acids
having the following amino acid sequence: Met Gln Ala ...
[remainder of 168 amino acid sequence].
7. The purified and isolated cDNA of bovine heparin-binding
growth factor having the following nucleotide sequence:
GAGTGGAGAG ... [remainder of 1196 nucleotide sequence]. 61
The examiner and the Board rejected the independent claims as
obvious over the prior art which (1) described general cloning
techniques to isolate DNA or cDNA molecules, and (2) disclosed a
group of protein growth factors designated as heparin-binding brain
mitogens (HBBMs) isolated from human and bovine brain tissue.6 2
According to the Board, the HBBMs were the same as HBGFs and
the genes encoding each protein were identical.63 Upon review, the
CAFC reversed.64 The court analyzed separately claims reciting the
precise cDNA sequence (claims 5 and 7) and claims reciting the DNA
sequence encoding the amino acid sequence (claims 4 and 6).
With respect to claims reciting the cDNA sequence, the court
observed that the prior art did not disclose the specific cDNA
sequences and held that:
while the general idea of the claimed molecules, their function, and
their general chemical nature may have been obvious from [the
prior art], and the knowledge that some gene existed may have
been clear, the precise -[claimed] cDNA molecules ... would not
have been obvious over the [prior art] because [the prior art]
teaches proteins, not the claimed or closely related cDNA
molecules.65
The court reasoned that the "redundancy of the genetic code
precluded contemplation of or focus on the specific cDNA molecules
of [the rejected claims]" and concluded that "[w]hat cannot be
contemplated or conceived cannot be obvious."66 The court, however,
again left open the possibility that when prior art discloses a
sufficiently small and simple protein, each possible resulting DNA
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1555-56.
63. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995). There is no dispute that by 1981,
"the use of probes to locate specific gene sequences in cDNA libraries of specific to moderate
complexities was well within the skill of the art." Id. at 1556.
64. Id. at 1560.
65. Id. at 1558 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
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may be obvious over the protein.
The CAFC noted that "no particular one of these DNAs can be
obvious unless there is something in the prior art to lead to the
particular DNA and indicate that it should be prepared."68
Emphasizing that the claims at issue were directed to compounds
rather than methods, the court reaffirmed the principle from Bell that
a general method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is "essentially
irrelevant" to whether the specific molecules themselves would have
been obvious.69 According to the CAFC, even if it may have been
"obvious to try" to derive a cDNA molecule because a general
method of isolating the cDNA was known in the art, it does not
necessarily make a particular cDNA obvious. 70 As the article will
explain below, this rationale has been weakened by the Supreme
Court's decision in KSR.
With respect to the claims reciting the DNA sequence encoding
the amino acid sequence, the CAFC held that these claims are of a
broader scope than claims 5 and 7 because they encompass all human
and bovine DNA encoding HBGFs, and thus are tantamount to
claiming the general idea of all genes encoding the protein.7 1 The
CAFC explained:
[s]uch an idea might have been obvious from the complete amino
acid sequence of the protein, coupled with the knowledge of the
genetic code, because this information may have enabled a person
of ordinary skill in the art to envision the idea of, and, perhaps with
the aid of the computer, even identify all members of the claimed
72genus.
In this case, however, the CAFC found these claims nonobvious
because the prior art disclosed only a partial amino acid sequence of
the protein.
II. KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. v. TELEFLEX INC.
The Supreme Court in KSR seriously weakened the rationale
behind the CAFC's approach to obviousness of claims directed to
genetic sequences. While KSR did not address claims to genetic
67. Id. at 1559.
68. Id. at 1558-59.
69. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1560.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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sequences, the Court's approach re-established the primacy of the
Graham framework and underlined the importance of considering all
relevant factors in an obviousness analysis rather than focusing on
artificial tests.
The invention in KSR related to an adjustable pedal assembly
with an electronic pedal-position sensor.74 The claims related to a
mechanism for combining the electronic sensor with the adjustable
pedal such that the pedal's position could be transmitted to the
vehicle's computer. 75 The prior art separately disclosed adjustable
pedals and various sensors but none of the references taught the
specific position of electronic sensors as claimed. The district court
found the patent claims to be obvious by applying the Graham
framework and granted summary judgment on invalidity.n On appeal,
the CAFC reversed finding that the district court did not strictly apply
the teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) test.78
The CAFC has devised the TSM test to guard against so-called
"hindsight bias" wherein an invention appears obvious once it is
known by virtue of having been invented as of the time of review
even though it might not have been obvious at the time of invention.79
Under the TSM test, a finding of obviousness requires the entire
relevant prior art to provide "some teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine the references" to create the newly claimed
invention.so
While the CAFC repeatedly stated that a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine the prior art references does not have to be
explicit, and could be implied from the prior art as a whole," it
appears that it has not always been faithful in its own application of
74. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 408-09.
77. Id. at 412-13.
78. Id. at 413.
79.See, e.g, In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Rouffet, 149
F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that the "examiner must show reasons that the
skilled artisan, confronted with the same problems as the inventor and with no knowledge of the
claimed invention, would select the elements from the cited prior art references for combination
in the manner claimed."). However, as Professor Eisenberg points out, hindsight analysis is
more or less inevitable since both § 103 and the Supreme Court require the evaluation of "the
[invention] as a whole" and comparison with the prior art, which is only possible ex post facto,
i.e. once the invention is made. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma's Nonobvious Problem, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 375, 383 (2008).
80.In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1355.
81.See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006); AIza Corp. v. Mylan
Lab., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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the TSM test.
In KSR, the CAFC explained that the motivation to combine the
cited prior art could not be found in the nature of the problem to be
solved since the prior art references did not address the precise
problem toward which the patentee directed his research. 82
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the CAFC.8 3
In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the Graham framework and rejected
what it deemed to be the CAFC's excessively rigid application of the
TSM test. Justice Kennedy, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that
the obviousness analysis "need not seek out precise teachings directed
to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ."84 He indicated that there may
still have to be some reason to combine the references when the
obviousness analysis considers a combination of prior art. The Court
explained that
[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the
design community or present in the market place; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill
in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent
reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by
the patent at issue.
Elaborating further, the Court noted that
[a]s is clear from cases such as Adams, a patent composed of
several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating
that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior
art.... [I]t can be important to identify a reason that would have
prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine
the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. 86
The Court concluded by stating that while "[t]here is no necessary
inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the
Graham analysis. But when a court transforms the general principle
into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of
Appeals did here, it errs. One possible method to prove
82. KSR Int'l Co., at 1738 (citing 119 Fed. Appx. 282, at 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
83. Id. at 404.
84. Id. at 418.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 419.
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obviousness "is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a
known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed
by the patent's claims."" The obviousness of the solution however
must be judged without hindsight.89
The Court identified four errors in the CAFC's obviousness
analysis. The first error was in holding that courts and patent
examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to
solve. 90 Justice Kennedy explained that "any need or problem known
in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the
patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner
claimed."91 The Court also held that theoCAFC erred in assuming that
"a person of ordinary skill in the art attempting to solve a problem
will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the
same problem." 9 2 It stressed that, often, familiar items may have
several obvious uses, and frequently, a person of ordinary skill is able
"to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a
puzzle." 93 A "person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton."9 4 The third error in the CAFC's
analysis was in concluding that a patent claim cannot be proved
obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was
"' [o]bvious to try.' 95 Justice Kennedy opined:
[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the
known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious
under§ 103.96
Finally, the Court held that the CAFC reached its erroneous
conclusion due to "hindsight bias."97 While the fact finder should be
88. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
89. See generally id.
90. Id. at 420.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
95. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 Fed. Appx.
282, 289 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
96. Id. at 421.
97. Id.
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aware of the distortions caused by hindsight bias and "ex post
reasoning[,] ... [r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders
recourse to common sense . . . are neither necessary under our case
law nor consistent with it.""
The lesson from KSR is two-fold. The Court established that
application of the TSM test must be flexible to avoid establishing a
per se rule of obviousness. The broader implication of KSR is that
faithful application of the Graham framework is central to the
determination of obviousness. In light of KSR, the CAFC's position in
Deuel becomes untenable because it transplants the obviousness
analysis suitable to one area of science (chemical compounds) to
another area where it is unsuitable (genetic sequences), rather than
relying on the Supreme Court's Graham framework.
III. WHY THE EXISTING OBVIOUSNESS TEST OF CLAIMS TO GENETIC
SEQUENCES IS UNWORKABLE AND OUR PROPOSED TEST
Perhaps emboldened by KSR, the BPAI appears to have
disregarded the CAFC's Deuel framework in Kubin. While the Board
tried to distinguish the two cases, we believe that the distinctions do
not adequately justify a different result. It is best to reconcile the
cases and provide guidance to the patent bar and courts by rejecting
the outdated Deuel framework and devising a test consistent with
KSR.
A. Ex Parte Kubin
In Kubin, the claimed invention related to polynucleotides
encoding natural killer ("NK") Cell Activation Inducing Ligand
("NAIL") polypeptides. 99 NAIL is a cell surface marker, or receptor,
modulating the activity of NK cells. 00 Kubin's patent application
disclosed a human version of NAIL.10 ' cDNA clones of the claimed
human NAIL were isolated and its nucleotide and amino acid
sequences were known in the art.102 It was also known that the
claimed human NAIL antibodies appeared to suppress cell mediated
98. Id.
99. Ex Parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1411 (B.P.A.I. 2007), aff'd 561 F.3d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). NK cells are believed to mediate defenses against various infections, to
be involved in resisting and controlling cancer, and to play a role in mediating transplant
rejections. Id. at 1411-12.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1412.
102. Id.
16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
immunity. 0 3 Thus, the application speculated that the determination
of binding to the claimed human NAIL could be useful to identify
active variants of NAIL.'" Representative claim 73 recited as
follows: "An isolated nucleic acid molecule comprising a
polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide at least 80% identical to amino
acids 22-221 of SEQ ID NO: 2, wherein the polypeptide binds
CD48." 05
The examiner rejected the claim as obvious over the combination
of prior art disclosing the same protein as NAIL and methods of
isolating that particular protein's cDNA using well known
techniques. 06 On appeal to the Board, appellants argued that Deuel
precluded the examiner's obviousness arguments.' 07 The Board
questioned whether "[a]ppellants' claimed nucleotide sequence have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, based on Valiante's
disclosure of p38 and his express teachings how to isolate its cDNA
by conventional techniques?"o It found that the applicant used
conventional methods to isolate a cDNA encoding of NAIL. 109 The
Board also found that since the state of the art had significantly
advanced since Deuel, the prior art provided a reasonable expectation
of success in isolating NAIL cDNA."' 0 The Board found that a
PHOSITA would have recognized the value of isolating NAIL cDNA
and would have been motivated to apply conventional techniques,
such as those disclosed and utilized in the prior art, to do so. "'
Ultimately, the Board affirmed the examiner's obviousness
rejection, holding that "[r]egardless of some factual similarities
between Deuel and this case, Deuel is not controlling and thus does
not stand in the way of our conclusion, given the increased level of
skill in the art and the factual differences."ll 2 Seemingly contradicting
Deuel, the Board stated that "an obvious method of obtaining a single
nucleic acid molecule encoding NAIL may be all that is required to
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1412 (B.P.A.I. 2007), aff'd 561 F.3d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
106. Id. The claims were also rejected as allegedly failing 35 U.S.C. § 112 written
description and enablement requirements; we do not discuss these rejections in this Article.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1413.
110. Id.
Ill. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1413 (B.P.A.I. 2007), af'd 561 F.3d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
112. Id.
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show that the presently claimed genus of nucleic acid molecules is
unpatentable under § 103.""
This holding appears to contradict the CAFC's language in
Deuel that obviousness requires that there be:
prior art that suggests the claimed compound in order for a prima
facie case of obviousness to be made out ... [tihus, even if, as the
examiner stated, the existence of general cloning techniques,
coupled with knowledge of a protein's structure, might have
provided motivation to prepare a cDNA or made it obvious to
prepare a cDNA,[] that does not necessarily make obvious a
particular claimed cDNA.114
Perhaps acknowledging the tension between its holding and that of
Deuel, the Board implied that there were important factual differences
between the two cases, and hinted that the Supreme Court in KSR
might have implicitly abrogated Deuel:
[t]o the extent Deuel is considered relevant to this case, we note
the Supreme Court recently cast doubt on the viability of Deuel to
the extent the CAFC rejected an "obvious to try" test.... Under
KSR, it's now apparent [that] "obvious to try" may be an
appropriate test in more situations than we previously
contemplated. When there is motivation to solve a problem and
there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to anticipated
success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary
skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination
was obvious to try might show that [the combination is] obvious
under§ 103.115
Finally, the Board noted that the "problem" faced by those in the art is
the appropriate method by which to isolate cDNA encoding NAIL. 16
It found motivation to combine in the limited number of possible
methods, reasoning that a PHOSITA would have been motivated to
try all available methods with a reasonable expectation of success."'
B. Kubin is Irreconcilable with Bell and Deuel
The Board's holding in Kubin is impossible to reconcile with the
113. Id. at 1414.
114. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
115. Exparte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1414.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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outdated framework of Bell and Deuel. In Deuel, the CAFC expressly
stated that the existence of a general method of isolating cDNA is
"essentially irrelevant" to the obviousness of the specific isolated
cDNA." 8 In stark contrast, in Kubin, the Board expressly relied on
the knowledge of "conventional techniques" to find the claims at
issue obvious.l 9
Some commentators, and the Kubin Board itself, have suggested
that the differences in facts between Deuel and Kubin are sufficient to
support the Board's holding the claims in Kubin obvious without
violating Deuel.120 However, our analysis of the three key cases
indicates that these factual differences are insufficient. The
similarities and differences of Bell, Deuel, and Kubin are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1 illustrates that there were two types of claims at issue in
Deuel: (1) claims reciting a specific cDNA sequence (i.e. a copy of
mRNA encoding the protein), and (2) claims of a seemingly broader
scope encompassing all DNA sequences encoding the protein. The
claims at issue in Kubin were the latter: a nucleic acid molecule
encoding a specific polypeptide. 12 1
The CAFC in Deuel stated that broad-scope claims, like those in
Kubin, might be obvious if "the complete amino acid sequence of the
protein [is known]."1 22 In Kubin, while the protein itself, the nucleic
acid, and nucleotide sequences of the mouse version of the protein
were known in the art, the complete amino acid sequence of the NAIL
protein was not known to a skilled artisan. 12 3 Nevertheless, the Board
found that the prior art taught how to obtain the complete NAIL
amino acid and nucleotide sequence.124 However, under Deuel, a
known methodology of obtaining amino acid sequences is irrelevant;
what is relevant is that there are no structurally similar prior art
118. Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559.
119. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1410, 1415 (B.P.A.I. 2007), aff'd 561 F.3d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
120. Posting of Kevin Noonan to DNA Non-obviousness under Ex parte Kubin (It Gets
Worse) on PatentlyO, Oct. 18, 2007, http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patentdocs/2007/10/dna-
non-obvious.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1412.
121. Id. at 1412. Moreover, claims in Kubin were of an even greater scope since they
encompassed DNA molecules encoding a protein with at least 80% identity to NAIL protein.
121.
122. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
123. Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q. 1410 at 1412-1413; id. at 1413.
124. Id. at 1413 ("The DNA and protein sequences of p38, and thus, NAL, could have
been obtained by conventional methodologies, such as those taught by Sambrook.").
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nucleotide sequences. 125 Under the facts in Kubin, there were no
structurally similar prior art nucleotide sequences, and thus, the
Board's conclusion appears to be inconsistent with the CAFC's
holding in Deuel.
Some may argue that the result reached by the Board in Kubin is
consistent with the statement made by the CAFC in Deuel that
knowledge of the full amino acid sequence might render the claims to
DNA sequences encoding the protein obvious. We disagree. First, the
CAFC qualified its statement by noting that the protein must be
"sufficiently small and simple."1 26 Thus, it follows that if a protein is
sufficiently large, then under the CAFC's framework, even claims to
the entire DNA sequence encoding this protein may not be obvious in
the absence of structural similarities to prior art nucleotide sequences.
Second, Bell seems to preclude a finding of obviousness even when
the full amino acid sequence is known. The CAFC in Bell found
claims to the specific nucleic acid sequences to be nonobvious despite
the fact that the entire amino acid sequence of the protein was known
in the art. 127 Under this reasoning, it follows that since the complete
amino acid sequence of the protein at issue in Kubin was not known
in the art, the claims at issue cannot be obvious under the Deuel test.
Table 1. Distinguishing In re Bell, In re Deuel, and Ex Parte Kubin
Ex Parte
In re Bell In re Deuel KxbinKubin
DNA sequence
Two types of encoding a
. polypeptide atA specific nucleic claims: let 80
acid sequence ("A Specific cDNA .ent to
Claims' composition sequence; speific ao
Scope comprising . .. 5- DNA sequence aci seun
GGA CCG ... encoding '
GCU-3') specific amino wherein the
acid sequence polypeptidebinds a specified
protein.
The amino
Knowledge of The entire amino A partial amino acid sequence
125. Deuel,51 F.3d at 1559.
126. Id.
127. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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the Amino acid sequence was acid sequence was not
Acid known was known. known, but the
Sequence of art taught the
the Protein protein and
how to obtain
the amino acid
sequence.
The amino
acid and
nucleotide
sequence of
the mouse
homolog was
known.
General
Methods to
Msodte and Known in the art Known in the art Known in the art
Isolate and
Clone cDNA
A nucleotide A known
Aronuceote probe; not monoclonal
robepre;fispecifically antibody
Probesecinc a disclosed in the specific to thedisclosed in the art
art same protein.
Homolog of Yes, mouse
the Protein in No No homolog forOther Species human protein
It naturally flows that under the logic of Deuel, knowing how to
obtain the complete amino acid sequence is not enough for
obviousness unless the sequence is itself actually known. After all,
only a partial amino acid sequence of the protein was known in
Deuel. The art essentially taught the process of obtaining the full
amino acid sequence. This is precisely what Deuel did to derive his
invention; he used unmodified conventional methods to determine the
full amino acid sequence of the protein. 128 Thus, our analysis compels
128. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (describing how Deuel isolated and
purified HBGF protein, determined the first 25 amino acids, isolated a cDNA molecule
encoding bovine uterine HBGF by screening bovine uterine cDNA library, purified and
sequenced the cDNA molecule, and then from the cDNA's sequence predicted the complete
amino acid sequence of bovine uterine HBGF).
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the conclusion that if Bell and Deuel were still good law, the Board in
Kubin should have found the disputed claims obvious despite any
factual differences between the cases. However, on legal and policy
grounds, we believe that the Board reached the correct result because
Deuel and Bell were seriously undercut by KSR. Because the Board's
reasoning is somewhat imprecise, the CAFC should take the
opportunity to expressly overrule Deuel and Bell and enunciate a new
standard of determining the obviousness of claims to genetic
sequences.
C. The CAFC Got it Wrong in In re Deuel
The main holding of Deuel can be summarized as affirming "the
principle, stated in Bell, that the existence of a general method of
isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the
question whether the specific molecules themselves would have been
obvious, in the absence of other prior art that suggests the claimed
DNAs."1 29 Thus, according to the CAFC's framework, it is virtually
impossible to establish obviousness of such claims unless structurally
similar DNA molecules are already known in the art. The focus of the
CAFC's analysis is not on whether the invention would have been
obvious to a PHOSITA, but rather on whether structurally similar
molecules are known in the art.
First, this reasoning forces the square peg of the obviousness
analysis of chemical compounds into the round hole of the
obviousness analysis of claims to genetic sequences. By the way of
background, the CAFC devised a special test for chemical
compounds, under which a prima facie case of obviousness requires
"structural similarity between claimed and prior art subject matter ...
where the prior art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed
compositions."13 0 Once the prima facie case is established, an
examiner must show some motivation to modify the prior art
compound.'3 1 Usually, this prong does not present a high burden since
the motivation may be found in the knowledge that structurally
similar compounds often display similar properties. All that is
required for a finding of obviousness is a "reasonable expectation of
success, not absolute predictability."1 32 After both prongs have been
129. Id. at 1559.
130. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (quoting In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting In re Longi, 759 F.2d 896 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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satisfied, the burden shifts to the applicant to overcome the prima
facie case by demonstrating unexpected results or some other
evidence of nonobviousness. 13 3
This analysis may make logical and scientific sense in the
context of chemical compounds where it is appropriate to consider
whether structurally similar compounds are known in the art, and
whether such compounds can be modified by known methodologies
to arrive at the claimed compound.134 The structurally similar
compound is often the starting point for synthesizing new compounds.
It is also usually reasonable to assume that structurally similar
compounds may have similar properties. Moreover, an applicant can
overcome a prima facie case of obviousness through the use of
secondary evidence such as unexpected results.
However, this framework is ill-suited for genetic sequences
because it does not consider the special nature of genes. A PHOSITA
attempting to determine the DNA sequence of a protein does not
generally start his search by looking at structurally similar DNA
sequences. Instead, he starts by determining the amino acid sequence
of the protein. 135 Once the amino acid sequence has been determined,
a PHOSITA can design and use nucleotide probes to uncover the
protein's DNA sequence. 136 It is irrelevant to the analysis whether the
prior art discloses a structurally similar cDNA molecule. The
relationship between a DNA molecule and the protein it encodes is
governed not by the structural similarities but by "information that is
transferred between them."l 37 In other words, a DNA molecule and
the protein it encodes are interrelated since the DNA determines the
protein and its functions.138 Thus, insisting that the claimed DNA has
to itself be suggested in the art misses the whole point of the
gene/protein relationship.
Second, the CAFC's rejection of what it called a "general"
motivation to find a gene is also puzzling. The court noted in Deuel
that where claims are directed to specific cDNA compounds, "any
motivation [to derive] that existed . .. [is] a general one, to try to
obtain a gene that was yet undefined and may have constituted many
133. Id. at 1345.
134. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 688.
135. Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents:
Protecting Biomedical Research From the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 143, 153
(2000).
136. Id. at 156.
137. Id. at 154.
138. Id. at 148.
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forms."l 3 9 But of course, a gene is "undefined" until it is found and
sequenced.14 0 As the Supreme Court admonished in KSR, any reason
to combine the prior art references is sufficient for a prima facie case
of obviousness. 141 There are usually several reasons why a PHOSITA
would like to know the genetic sequence of a protein: for example,
knowledge of its genetic sequence may lead to a greater
understanding of the role the protein plays; it may also help to enable
its large scale production. Thus, there is a clear motivation to find the
sequence by isolating the corresponding cDNA sequence.
The following hypothetical may help illustrate the issue more
clearly. Imagine that a skilled hacker is faced with encrypted text. He
knows that decrypting the text may lead to some important and useful
information. Surely, the existence of a general method of decrypting
the text is relevant to the question of whether the claims to the
decrypted text itself are obvious. Even though the decrypted words
are unknown before the decryption, a PHOSITA would have every
reason to decode the text with a reasonable expectation of success if
the general method of decrypting is known.
Third, the CAFC stated that "[t]he redundancy of the genetic
code precluded contemplation of or focus on the specific cDNA
molecules.... [It] permits one to hypothesize an enormous number of
DNA sequences coding for the protein." 4 2 However, the CAFC's
reliance on the redundancy of the genetic code in its obviousness
analysis is mistaken.
The court itself recognized that by 1990 a PHOSITA already
knew how to isolate DNAs and cDNAs by screening a DNA or cDNA
library with a gene probe. 143 As stated by Varma & Abraham, "the
state of cloning procedures at the time of the invention in Bell
allowed routine handling of such large numbers of possible
sequences." 4 4 Even though the genetic code is redundant, each
protein's amino acid sequence is specified by a unique nucleotide
139. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
140. Id.
141. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (stating that "[u]nder the
correct analysis, any need of problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention
and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner
claimed.").
142. Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558.
143. Id. at 1556 (describing the Maniatis manual).
144. Varma & Abraham, supra note 29, at 73. The invention in Bell was prior to Deuel.
Therefore, if the art could deal with the redundancy in Bell, then it necessarily could do so in
Deuel.
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sequence. It is true that the path to discovery for a PHOSITA would
be easier if there were no genetic redundancy. However, just because
the path to invention may be longer does not mean that the path does
not exist. Thus, while the genetic code is in fact redundant, it was well
within the skill in the art to deal with the redundancy.
Implicit in the CAFC's reasoning in Deuel is a false presumption
that, due to the redundancy of the genetic code, a PHOSITA would
have no way to determine which one of all theoretically possible
DNA sequences would be more likely to encode the protein. In
reality, at the time of Deuel's invention, a PHOSITA was well
positioned to deal with this redundancy and even better positioned to
do so at the time of this article. Commentator Dastgheib-Vinarov, in
his 2000 article, provides a useful overview of the advances in the
state of the art that reduced the guesswork of biotechnology scientists
in determining the DNA sequence of a protein.145 The author
describes extensive use of optimum DNA probes, computer programs
predicting useful protein-coding regions to design oligonucleotide
probes, spliced alignment algorithm software, and various other
genetic research tools developed since 1990 - the priority date of
Deuel's application - that would aid in ascertaining a particular DNA
sequence. 146 Undoubtedly, even more research tools and
methodologies have been developed since that article's publication.
Fourth, the rationale behind both Bell and Deuel has been fatally
undercut by the Supreme Court's decision in KSR, albeit not for the
same reason suggested by the Board in Kubin. The central theme
throughout KSR was the application of common sense, i.e. pondering
whether there was a reason to combine the elements of the prior art in
the manner of the invention. 147 While the questions certified to the
Court were related to identifying when a combination of references is
proper, the Court went out of its way to reaffirm the crucial
importance of the Graham obviousness framework and re-established
the "expansive and flexible approach" for an obviousness inquiry.148
As a result, one attempting to determine the obviousness of a claimed
invention must analyze the scope and content of the prior art,
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, the level of
skill in the art, secondary considerations, and any other relevant
145. Dastgheib-vinarov, supra note 138, at 156, 158-65.
146. Id.
147. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 418 (2007).
148. Id. at 415.
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evidence. 149 It logically follows that any per se nonobviousness rules
are disfavored because, by definition, they preclude the sort of
"expansive and flexible" inquiry mandated by the Court. 50 The KSR
Court explained that "if a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it
would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique
is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." 5 1
In rejecting what he perceived to be an overly rigid application
of the TSM test by the CAFC, Justice Kennedy concluded that "when
a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the
obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs."l 52
When we apply the logic of KSR to the facts of Deuel and Bell it
becomes clear that, as in KSR, "the Court of Appeals analyzed the
issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with § 103 and [the
Supreme Court's] precedents."153 In both cases, the CAFC failed to
conduct a complete Graham analysis of the claims at issue and
appears to have improperly transplanted the requirement from one
area of patent law (chemistry) to another (gene patents). Instead, the
obviousness inquiry by the CAFC should have tested whether the
DNA molecules in question have been obvious to a PHOSITA where
the skill included the ability to use conventional methods of isolating
DNA. By adding the requirement of structural similarity to known
DNA molecules, the Deuel test fails to satisfactorily address the
Supreme Court's Graham framework. 154
To summarize, the Deuel approach to a determination of
obviousness appears to be incorrect and inconsistent with the
fundamental inquiry mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 103: whether the
invention (i.e., the cDNA molecules at issue) would have been
obvious at the time it was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art. We disagree with the CAFC in its rigid application of the
obviousness test for chemical compounds to the analysis of claims to
genetic sequences. As Judge Rader noted in his In re Fisher dissent,
the CAFC "has deprived the [USPTO] of the obviousness
149. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
150. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
151. Id. at 417.
152. Id. at 419.
153. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 418, 427-28 (2007).
154. It may be instructive that, to the best of the Authors' research and knowledge, no
other developed country requires a determination of structural similarity in an obviousness
inquiry of claims to genetic sequences.
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requirement for genomic inventions."'155 The CAFC's approach is
especially incompatible with Graham and KSR because it relies on
rigid rules without taking into consideration all relevant factors. The
good news is that the CAFC is currently reconsidering its approach in
the pending appeal of Kubin.
D. Our Proposed Test to Determine Obviousness of Claims to
Genetic Sequences
1. Two-Prong Prima Facie Inquiry
As we have indicated in prior sections of this article, the existing
obviousness test for claims to genetic sequences is too rigid and is
likely at odds with KSR. As Justice Kennedy admonished, it is
precisely the sort of "[r]igid preventative rule[] that den[ies]
factfinders recourse to common sense."15 6 Accordingly, our proposed
obviousness test for claims to genetic sequences relies on common
sense and is consistent with the Graham and KSR framework.
The inquiry under our proposed test begins with the question of
whether an examiner or the reviewing court can make out a prima
facie case for obviousness. To establish a prima facie case of
obviousness, one needs to demonstrate that (1) the protein encoded by
the claimed sequence(s) is known in the art, and (2) its amino acid
sequence is known in the art or can be readily determined by
conventional methods. If the prima facie case is established, the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut by, for example, relying on
"secondary considerations,"15 1 unexpected results, and/or surprising
or unexpected properties of the sequences. For example, some
commentators deem it important for an obviousness analysis to
consider whether a cell or tissue source of the protein is known.'58 We
doubt that knowledge of the source of the protein is important in
every obviousness inquiry; however, it can be freely considered under
our test to the extent that it is unexpected or surprising - in
conformance with Graham and KSR.
Our test adopts many of its features from the existing CAFC
obviousness jurisprudence for claims to chemical compounds with the
155. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rayder, J., dissenting).
156. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
157. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)
158. See, e.g., posting of Kevin Noonan to DNA Non-obviousness under Ex parte Kubin (It
Gets Worse) on PatendyO, Oct. 18, 2007,
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent-docs/2007/10/dna-non-obvious.html (last viewed Sept. 9,
2008).
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key distinction being the different prima facie case requirements. We
recognize that, in contrast to chemical compounds, the relationship
between a DNA molecule and the protein it encodes is based not on
structural similarities but on the transfer of information from one to
the other. Therefore, the focus of our test is not on structurally similar
DNA molecules but on the protein and the known information about
the protein in the art. The two-prong prima facie requirement makes
our test fully compatible with KSR: our test's primary inquiry is
whether the claimed invention is more than the product of ordinary
techniques by one skilled in the art. To answer this question, our test
considers the invention as a whole (i.e., specific DNA or RNA
sequences) in full view of the prior art (i.e., the protein, available
information about the protein, and known methods to deduce the
DNA sequence of a protein). As it is generally desirable to deduce the
DNA sequence of a protein, our test makes hindsight bias a near
nonissue. In other words, one would almost always like to deduce the
nucleic sequence of a protein, and assuming there is nothing
surprising about the nucleic sequence or the methods used to
sequence the DNA, knowledge of the protein makes claims to its
nucleic sequence prima facie obvious.
2. Analytical Application of Our Test
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed test, we apply
it to the facts of Bell, Deuel, and Kubin.
In Bell, the proteins, human insulin-like growth factors I and II,
were known in the art at the time of invention.159 The entire amino
acid sequences of these proteins were also known. 160 Thus, under our
two-prong test, the claims at issue in Bell are prima facie obvious.
Establishing the prima facie case for obviousness shifts the burden to
the applicant to prove that the claims at issue are nonobvious.
However, absent some compelling secondary considerations or
unexpected properties or results, the claims remain obvious.
Turning to Deuel, the protein, heparin-binding growth factor,
was known in the prior art.16' Even though only the first 25 amino
acids of the protein's N-terminal sequence were already known, the
entire amino acid sequence could have been (and in fact was)
determined by conventional methodologies.162 Thus, as in Bell,
159. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
160. Id.
161. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
162. Id. at 1555.
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Deuel's claims are prima facie obvious under our test. Assuming the
absence of relevant secondary considerations or unexpected
properties or results, the claims also remain obvious. One
commentator noted that while the prior art taught that the protein in
question was expressed in the brain, Bell isolated the cDNA encoding
of the protein from the placenta. 163 This does not change the result of
the inquiry under our test because our test does not distinguish
between claims to precise cDNA sequences and those encompassing
all protein-encoding DNA. This unexpected property of the protein
may make the case a closer call; however, the claims in question are
nonetheless likely obvious because they were derived by known
methods.
Finally, to address the claims in Kubin, the protein in question,
NAIL, was known. While the amino acid sequence was not known in
the art at the time of invention, it could be readily determined because
the art taught methodologies for isolating a cDNA using an antibody
that reacted with the protein. Thus, as in Bell and Deuel, our test finds
the claims in Kubin to be prima facie obvious. As before, assuming
that there are no secondary considerations or unexpected properties or
results, the claims at issue are obvious as a matter of law. 164
The straight-forward application of the test reaches a logical
result and furthers the proper public policy. As we have demonstrated,
our test's flexibility allows us to consider the state of the relevant art
at the time of invention to determine obviousness. We have avoided
crafting a rigid rule of prima facie obviousness by incorporating
common sense into the obviousness analysis to the extent that it is in
line with Graham and KSR. Because of our two-prong inquiry, we are
able to avoid hindsight bias because the invention itself is not an
element that is taken into consideration - only the state of the art. Our
test's reliance on common sense allows it to have broad application in
the area of claims to genetic sequences.
3. Response to Possible Criticism
While we believe that our test is sound and has broad application
to claims directed to genetic sequences, some commentators may
criticize its structure and application. Therefore, we will directly
163. See Dennis Crouch, Ex Parte Kubin: Overcoming the Deuel, July 17, 2007,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/07/ex-parte-kubin-.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
164. As Kevin Noonan notes, the prior art taught that human NAIL mRNA was not
expressed in the cell type used to isolate the cDNA of the protein. Noonan, supra note 124. We
believe that in this particular case, despite this somewhat unexpected property, the claims are
still obvious in view of all the available evidence.
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address some possible criticism.
Some may argue, for example, that a new test for obviousness is
unnecessary because the Board in Kubin was able to successfully
distinguish the operative facts of Kubin from the facts in Deuel to
reach the correct result. Where claims are truly obvious, Deuel can
again be distinguished on its facts as was done in Kubin. Thus, one
suggestion may be that the CAFC should limit Kubin to its facts,
while leaving the basic Bell/Deuel framework in place.
The problem with this argument is that, in our opinion, the Board
in Kubin was forced to strain the factual differences between Kubin
and Deuel to reach the proper result. This had a double effect of (1)
leaving the law of obviousness as it relates to genetic sequences in a
state of uncertainty, and (2) creating the foreseeable possibility that
there will be cases where any factual differences may be incapable of
being stretched enough to distinguish that case from Deuel. Thus, the
holding in Kubin created more questions that it provided answers.
Unless the CAFC clarifies the present state of the law, applicants, the
USPTO and reviewing courts will be left with little guidance as how
to proceed. Our proposed test provides this guidance with a
straightforward two-prong analysis. Since our test is grounded in
common sense, it is internally consistent and is inherently flexible.
Another possible ground for criticism of our proposed test is that
it allegedly fails to consider certain factors that some may believe are
important to an obviousness analysis of claims to genetic sequences.
For example, one commentator suggests that it is important to
consider factors such as whether a sequence in question is highly
conserved, whether the art discloses closely-related species orthologs,
whether the cell or tissue of origin is reliably known, and whether
specific reagents, such as monoclonal antibodies, are readily
available. 16 5 We believe that some of these factors (particularly, the
cell or tissue of origin) may be taken into account in our test if they
can be classified as unexpected or surprising properties. However,
absent some surprising or unexpected result or characteristic, we
believe that these factors are generally irrelevant for an obviousness
determination. Our two-prong prima facie approach takes into
considerations the full state of the art - known or readily ascertainable
by conventional methods.
It can also be suggested that our test will, more often than not,
result in a finding of obviousness and, as a result, stifle the inventive
165. Noonan, supra note 124.
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process by granting fewer patents to deserving inventions. 16 6 For
example, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) argues in its
CAFC Kubin Amicus Brief that the Board's decision establishes a
"new obviousness doctrine," one that threatens modem drug
development.'6 7 BIO grounded its concern in that many active
compounds are often created or identified by routine methods - an
approach now allegedly endangered by the Board's reasoning in
Kubin.'
68
We emphasize that our test does not establish any new
obviousness doctrine. Instead, we attempted to develop an "expansive
and flexible" approach to determining obviousness of genetic
sequences consistent with the Graham framework, as re-confirmed by
KSR, and discarded the rigid and formulaic standard of Deuel that we
believe to be inconsistent with KSR. While it is true that our test may
lead to a more frequent finding of obviousness than under the Deuel
standard, only obvious inventions are in danger. It would not preclude
patentability of truly new and nonobvious claims to genetic
sequences.
Neither will our test interfere with modem drug development. As
the scope of the applicability of our test is limited to claims directed
to genetic sequences, our test would not be implicated in the
discovery and development of new drugs and treatments not
involving genetic sequences. Further, we agree with Professor
Eisenberg that the CAFC has developed flexible pharmaceutical
obviousness jurisprudence to address any remaining concerns.16 9
The key distinction between routine methods to isolate cDNA
and routine methods to create or discover a new chemical compound
is that to create a new chemical compound, a PHOSITA must make
one of nearly infinite structural modifications to the existing
compound. While this sort of modification may in some sense be
routine, it may not be obvious which modification should be made.
All possible modifications are, in a sense, correct - that is, it is
possible to create different compounds with each different
modification. In contrast, there is only one "correct" cDNA sequence
to be isolated, and absent some unexpected properties or difficulties
166. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Biotechnology Industry Organization Supporting
Appellants and Reversal, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 2008-1184),
available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/files/kubin.amicus.pdf
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Eisenberg, supra note 84, at 379-80.
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in isolating the cDNA sequence, it is routine to arrive at this sequence
with a reasonable expectation of success. In other words, a PHOSITA
does not have a choice as to which cDNA sequence to isolate because
there is only one correct cDNA sequence. All that one needs to do is
to use conventional methods to arrive at the only correct cDNA
sequence. Of course, the flexibility of our test allows for the
possibility that there may be some unique quality to a particular
sequence: e.g., some surprising property.
Thus, our test would not in any way endanger claims to
pharmaceutical compounds. Quite the contrary, our test would restore
the flexibility of the obviousness determination of claims to
pharmaceutical compounds to the area of claims to genetic sequences.
CONCLUSION
It is time for the CAFC to recognize that the Bell/Deuel
obviousness framework in the context of genetic sequences is too
rigid, favors form over substance, and must be overruled. We propose
a new test for obviousness of these types of claims, which is simply a
specific application of the Graham framework to claims to genetic
sequences.
Our proposed test sets out a two-prong prima facie inquiry that
tests (1) whether the protein encoded by the claimed sequence(s) is
known in the art, and (2) whether its amino acid sequence is known or
can be readily determined by the application of conventional methods.
Even after the prima facie case has been made, our test allows the
applicant to rebut it by, for example, relying on so-called "secondary
considerations," namely unexpected results, and/or surprising or
unexpected properties of the sequences. Our test restores the
obviousness analysis for claims to genetic sequences to the Graham
framework and provides a clear and flexible test for examiners and
courts in inquiring into the obviousness of these types of claims.
It makes little sense to allow patents of dubious validity to
remain in force and perpetuate an overbroad and improper patent
monopoly. Some may argue that such an approach would undermine
biotech companies that have large portfolios of gene patents issued
under the Deuel standard. However, the very existence of a patent
system is premised on the bargained-for exchange of a limited
monopoly for a full disclosure of a novel and nonobvious contribution
to the body of knowledge. If a contribution is obvious, it should be
returned to the public domain before expiration of the patent. If the
protected technology truly deserves patent protection after a proper
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finding of novelty and nonobviousness, it should remain so protected.
Despite any possible short-term negative effects that may result from
the application of our proposed test, the harmonization of U.S. and
international patent law would have long-term positive effects for
patent applicants, the patent system, and the general public interest.
ADDENDUM
On April 3, 2009, the CAFC ruled on the appeal of In re
Kubinl7 0 and affirmed the Board's finding of obviousness of the
claimed invention.171 Judge Rader, writing for the Court, first agreed
with the Board's finding that the applicants used conventional
techniques to isolate the claimed gene sequence. 172 He noted,
however, that any differences between the techniques used by
applicants and those taught by the prior art were not especially
relevant to the obviousness of the claims in question. This is because
the claims before the CAFC were directed to gene sequences, not to
techniques for isolating gene sequences. 73
The CAFC went on to expressly agree with our position that the
obviousness framework of KSR is directly implicated by the claims in
Kubin.17 4 In Kubin, the Board chose not to follow Deuel, stating that
it believed that the Supreme Court "cast doubt on the viability of
Deuel to the extent the Federal Circuit rejected an 'obvious to try'
test." 75 And the CAFC agreed:
Insofar as Deuel implies the obviousness inquiry cannot consider
that the combination of the claim's constituent elements was
"obvious to try," the Supreme Court in KSR unambiguously
discredited that holding.176
As we demonstrated and as the CAFC in Kubin noted, the
Supreme Court in KSR expressly held that a patent claim can be
proved obvious by showing that the combination of prior art elements
into a single invention was "obvious to try."177 KSR once again
clarified that "where a skilled artisan merely pursues 'known options'
from a 'finite number of identified, predictable solutions,'
170. 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
171. Id. at 1352.
172. Id. at 1354.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1358.
175. Id. (Citing KSR)
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1358.
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obviousness under § 103 arises."l 7 8 It also reinvigorated the well
known test that § 103 bars patentability unless "the improvement is
more than the predicable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions." 79
The Kubin three-judge panel did not (and could not) expressly
overturn Deuel. But it did rely on pre-Deuel precedent in In re
O'Farrell to essentially limit Deuel to its facts by holding that an
obviousness finding is appropriate where the prior art "contained
detailed enabling methodology for practicing the claimed invention, a
suggestion to modify the prior art to practice the claimed invention,
and evidence suggesting that it would be successful."' 80 While there
may be some uncertainty in the prior art regarding success of the
claimed combination, the CAFC in O'Farrell explained that a finding
of "obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success ...
all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success."'8 ' Judge
Rader noted that KSR "reinvigorated this perceptive analysis." 82
Applying KSR and O'Farrell to the facts in Kubin, the CAFC
held that the prior art disclosed the very protein of the applicants'
interest, provided ample motivation to isolate the gene coding for that
protein, and contained illustrative instructions on how to isolate the
gene coding.'8 3 Thus, the record was sufficiently complete to show
that a PHOSITA would have has a "reasonable expectation of
success" in deriving the claimed invention in light of the prior art. 84
By affirming the Board's finding of obviousness, the CAFC gave
direct support to our argument that the obviousness test announced in
In re Deuel was overly formulaic. Such a test cannot survive in a
post-KSR common-sense obviousness analysis. In fact, Judge Rader
expressed that, in light of KSR, the courts cannot "cling to formalistic
rules for obviousness, customize its legal tests for specific scientific
fields in ways that deem entire classes of prior art teachings
irrelevant, or discount the significant abilities of artisans of ordinary
skill in an advanced area of art." 8 1
Our proposed obviousness test for claims to genetic sequences is
based on a faithful application of O'Farrell and KSR. Its common-
178. Id. at 1359 (Quoting KSR)
179. Id. at 1359-60 (Quoting KSR).
180. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 853 F.2d at 902).
181. Id. (emphasis in original) (original citation omitted)( quoting 853 F.2d at 903-4).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1356-7.
184. Id. at 1360. (citing O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 904).
185. Id. (citing In re Durden,763 F.2d 1406, 1411 (Fed.Cir. 1985).
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sense analysis is true to the Graham framework because it considers
the state of the prior art and whether a combination of the prior art
would have been obvious to a PHOSITA at the time of invention.
Given that our test is very flexible and considers all relevant elements
of obviousness, it is completely consistent with Judge Rader's
admonition against formalistic rules and customized legal tests. It
further provides guidance to the patent bar and the courts on how to
properly apply the Graham and KSR obviousness framework to
claims for gene sequences in light of Kubin and O'Farrell.
